

# FAMILY, KINSHIP AND STATE IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE

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**Vol. 1**

**The Century of Welfare:  
Eight Countries**

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# Introduction: the reshaping of family and kin relations in European welfare systems

*Hannes Grandits*

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Europeans are clearly living in the era *after* the expansion of the welfare state – not to mention its virtual collapse in parts of Eastern Europe following 1989. Furthermore, during the European process of unification, ideas on adjusting the welfare regimes in the European Union were seriously investigated. These examinations made it patently clear to policy-makers that the interaction between welfare state policy and family/kin in Europe had developed in often quite diverse traditions. And although it would not be wrong from a global perspective to speak of a shared “European history” in terms of the welfare state (Kaelble 2004), the beliefs as to how it should function and the nature of its obligations still vary even today. Despite these differences, almost all European national policy discourses in recent decades have progressively come to the conclusion that the welfare state is overburdened. Demands that individual citizens and their family/kin take more responsibility for their social security have become louder.

The context outlined here constitutes the starting point for the research involved in this book, which analyses and compares European family and kinship over the last century, focusing on their role in the provision of social security. The aim is to reflect on the embodiment of family and kin in the historical development and functioning of the welfare state: what was and is the role of kinship and family in providing social security in European welfare state societies? How has the welfare state influenced family and kin relations?

These are the key questions raised in this volume, as they are crucial to the KASS research as a whole. The ethnographies, quantitative findings and theoretical contributions in Volumes II and III will tackle these common themes from complementary points of view. Here they are approached historically. In a critical evaluation of the historically varying relations of European welfare states to family and kin, the chapters of this

volume provide a detailed analysis of the twentieth-century development of kinship and social security in eight European countries. These eight countries represent individual welfare state ideologies in Europe and to some degree individual historical “cultures” of kinship in public and private life (or may at least hypothetically be regarded as such at the outset). Contrasts between the eight national examples can be outlined as follows:

- The contrast, for instance, between supposedly familistic *Italy* (studied by Viazzo and Zanotelli in chapter 2), which serves here as an example of a Mediterranean society, and the allegedly individualistic north European *Sweden* (analysed by Gaunt in chapter 3), a Scandinavian welfare state model.
- The contrast between *Germany* and *France*, which – not least as a result of the Second World War and the Nazi experience – pursued different ideologies in terms of how the state should be allowed to influence family life. While Germany (analysed by Rosenbaum and Timm in chapter 4) declared the family a private realm to be protected from state intervention, France (reconsidered by Augustins and Segalen in chapter 5) developed a distinctly interventionist “pro-family” welfare policy.
- *Austria* (investigated by Pfliegerl and Geserick in chapter 6) can be seen as an example of a small European country that remained politically “neutral” during the Cold War decades, when the welfare state went through considerable expansion throughout Europe, and later joined the EU integration process.
- Three chapters on *Croatia* (by Grandits in chapter 7), *Poland* (by Dyczewski in chapter 8) and *Russia* (by Trotsuk and Nikulin in chapter 9) – deal with family and kinship within the variants of socialist and post-socialist welfare state developments. These three chapters (three and a half if the chapter on Germany is included, where developments in the GDR are analysed comparatively) will give a better understanding of processes in Eastern Europe and enable us to make more fruitful comparisons between Western and Eastern Europe.

In the eight country chapters, i.e., on Sweden, Italy, France, Germany, Austria, Croatia, Poland and Russia, we will unearth in detail the characteristics of the interrelation between welfare state developments and family/kin. Despite the many peculiarities involved, there are general trends common to all eight countries. In this introductory chapter an attempt will be made to address some of them comparatively.

We begin with reflections on the “golden age” of marriage and its interrelation with the “golden age” of the welfare state in Europe of the 1950s and 1960s. We will then briefly refer to the emergence in recent decades of a new demographic situation throughout Europe. In the remaining sections of the chapter, European welfare state expansions and contractions will be discussed in relation to their consequences for family and kin relations.

## The golden age of marriage and the welfare state

Over the last thirty years social and family history has fundamentally altered our understanding of family life in Europe in the past. Projections about invariable or harmonious historical family relations have been deconstructed. A panorama has evolved of family models that differed according to region, class or the rural-urban divide, often to a pronounced extent. Discussions were launched, for instance, on the consequences of distinctive marriage or inheritance regimes, or with the aim of defining macro-regional specifics (see, for example, Laslett and Wall 1972; Mittlerauer and Sieder 1988; Viazzo 1989; Segalen 1990; Gullestad and Segalen 1997; Rosenbaum 1998; Viazzo 2003; Plakans and Wetherell 2003; Kertzer and Barbagli 2003).

Ideas about specific macro-regional family patterns have been the subject of an ongoing scientific debate. Family history and historical demography gradually developed the knowledge that historically quite different household formation characteristics prevailed in the different macro-regions of Europe. A household formation system in northwest Europe with a high predominance of simple households was contrasted with systems in the Mediterranean or in Eastern Europe, where larger family households were historically more common. Late marriage with high proportions of people who had never married was found to be widespread in the northwest or west of Europe (or in the Alpine regions of Central Europe), quite the reverse of Eastern Europe and many parts of the Mediterranean. In addition, the last two macro-regions differed fundamentally with regard to inheritance practices: male-centred forms of inheritance were dominant in vast areas of Eastern Europe, while in southern Europe conjugal-centred forms of inheritance predominated.

However, by the 1990s, this image of historically contrasting macro-regional forms of European family life was being questioned by a growing number of historical, anthropological and historical-anthropological micro-studies. A picture evolved of much more variability within the supposedly homogeneous macro-regions, and was explained as the result of a complex interplay of economic, ecological, demographic or cultural factors.

Nevertheless, a renewed validation of macro-regional differences came with closer scrutiny of the amount, mode and quality of interfamilial or kinship helping relations. This new “turn” in discussing models of European family life was also influenced by a recent series of European comparative quantitative studies (e.g., SHARE, ISSP or the European Value Surveys (EVS)) that also dealt with the importance of family and informal relations in social security arrangements in contemporary Europe (for a far more detailed discussion of these subsequent trends in historical family research Viazzo 2010; see also various papers in Grandits and Heady 2003; see also Gruber and Heady in this volume).

In the light of this condensed portrayal of diversity in family life in the Europe of the past and from the perspective of family history, it is surprising that the 1950s and 1960s can be viewed in retrospect as a period of unprecedented homogeneity throughout much of Europe. Marriage behaviour and consequently several household formation characteristics grew distinctly similar throughout most of Europe during these decades. This applied in particular to variables such as the marriage rate, marriage age or rate of children born “out of wedlock”.

In the initial decades after the Second World War, almost all societies in Europe experienced a marriage boom. Getting married became an almost universal part of the life-course. This was true for close to the entire generation of young men and women, even in countries where socio-economic constraints or cultural rules had precluded a substantial percentage of the population from marriage in earlier periods (the Princeton European Fertility Project provided us with highly detailed and comparative knowledge of the divergent proportions of the married and unmarried throughout large parts of Europe since the nineteenth century, as well as of transformation trends in the twentieth century (early second half); see, for instance, Coale and Treadway 1986). In addition, the marriage age for men and women, historically divergent throughout much of Europe, began to converge to a hitherto unknown degree (Watkins 1986).