Franziska Smolnik

Secessionist Rule

Protracted Conflict and Configurations of Non-state Authority

campus

Secessionist Rule

Mikropolitik der Gewalt – Micropolitics of Violence
Volume 12

Edited by Klaus Schlichte und Peter Waldmann

Franziska Smolnik is a research associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (Eastern Europe and Eurasia division).

Franziska Smolnik

Secessionist Rule

Protracted Conflict and Configurations of Non-state Authority

Campus Verlag
Frankfurt/New York

ISBN 978-3-593-50629-6 Print
ISBN 978-3-593-43514-5 E-Book (PDF)

Cover design: Campus Verlag GmbH, Frankfurt-on-Main
Cover illustration: Georgian-Abkhazian administrative boundary line, Enguri/Ingur
© Franziska Smolnik
Printing office and bookbinder: Beltz Bad Langensalza
Printed on acid free paper.
Printed in Germany

For further information:
www.campus.de
www.press.uchicago.edu

Contents

Map 1: The South Caucasus[1]



1 Taken from the website of Conciliation Resources (http://www.c-r.org/our-work/south-caucasus). Since borders in the South Caucasus are contested, all maps included in this book serve but illustrative purposes. They explicitly do not imply any claims on legal status or delimitation of territorial boundaries. Their labels may not correspond to the geographical terminology used here.

1 Introduction

To adopt the words of Jean-François Bayart (Bayart 2000, 229–30), the South Caucasus

"political societies are duplicated between, on the one hand, a pays légal, a legal structure, which is the focus of attention for multilateral donors and Western states, and on the other hand, a pays réel where real power is wielded".

This research focuses on the *pays réel*, on political authority beyond or convoluted with the trappings of legal-rational bureaucracy. In the cases that lie at the heart of this study the situation, however, is still more complex: Officially, a *pays légal* does not exist. While the South Caucasus self-proclaimed but internationally (largely) unrecognized states Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh exist *de facto*, they do not *de jure*.

1.1 *De facto* state or rebel region?

Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh constituted autonomous entities within the federal framework of the Soviet Union. The Autonomous Region of Nagorno-Karabakh with an ethnic Armenian majority was integrated in the Union Republic of Azerbaijan; the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia with its Abkhaz titular nation was located within the confines of the Union Republic of Georgia.[1] In the context of the Soviet demise, both in the Union Republics and the subordinated autonomous entities movements

1 I use '(the) Abkhaz' to refer to the titular ethnic group in Abkhazia. In contrast, I employ the notion 'Abkhazian' when referring to the entity as such. I use the notion '(Nagorno) Karabakh Armenian' to separate the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh from those of the Republic of Armenia or the Diaspora as well as, in particular when referring to the Soviet period, to distinguish them from the (now displaced) Azerbaijani population of the region.

for independence emerged, which came into conflict with one another: Georgia's agenda conflicted with the striving of the Abkhaz for independence; the secessionist aspirations of Nagorno-Karabakh's Armenians conflicted with the Azerbaijani national project.[2] Ultimately, these contradicting trajectories led to open warfare. Large-scale hostilities were ended by ceasefire agreements in the mid-1990s, yet, the violent conflicts between 'secessionist entities' and 'metropolitan states' have been persistent and peace agreements remain outstanding. Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia embarked upon developing separate institutions and declared themselves independent. Until today, however, their status remains in limbo. The former is not recognized by any country world-wide; the independence of the latter was officially endorsed by Russia and a couple of smaller states in the aftermath of the *Russian-Georgian War* of 2008, but comprehensive recognition is lacking.

The secessionists have sought to justify their position by stressing the right to self-determination. While except for the context of de-colonization, this principle has been construed as 'internal self-determination' within an existing state in form of cultural and ethnic rights, representtatives of Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh have claimed a territorial dimension. They have focused on 'external self-determination' and interpreted it as a right to secession.[3] Self-determination, however, collides with another central principle of international law, that of territorial integrity. The 'metropolitan states' Georgia and Azerbaijan have (largely) successfully enforced the latter's supremacy. The great majority of states has withheld recognition and thus corroborated the "sanctity of recognized boundaries" (Pegg 2004, 36). The literature on secession differentiates between successful and unsuccessful ones: Either independence of the secessionist entity is endorsed by other states or international recognition is not extended (cf. Pavković and Radan 2007, 5). From such a perspective the secessions of Abkhazia and even more so Nagorno-Karabakh have been unsuccessful. *De jure* the territories they claim belong to the Republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan. Yet, lack of juridical statehood notwithstanding, *de facto* control over a particular territory and population for over two

2 The Georgian national movement also conflicted with the striving for independence of South Ossetia. This third South Caucasus *de facto* state is not dealt with in this study, however.

3 On the issue of self-determination, cf. Borgen 2007; Pavković and Radan 2007, 19pp.

decades, the development of political institutions, and the claim to independent sovereignty challenge the picture of failed secession.

The resulting ambiguity has qualified Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh as unrecognized states.[4] Further notions used to address the entities reflect this duality. Alongside unrecognized state, the term *de facto* state is prevalent; somewhat less common is the notion of 'informal state'. After Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the third South Caucasus *de facto* state, the term partially/partly recognized state has gained in significance.[5] Others refer to the entities as quasi-states, para-states, or pseudo-states. These terms are more contested, however, as they are equally employed to address recognized states that scholars and peacebuilding practitioners have classified as 'failed', that is, states that possess external sovereignty but are considered to lack internal state capacity.[6] Not all notions focus on a lack of recognition combined with empirical statehood, though. Others, such as secessionist entity, renegade or breakaway region, put emphasis on the challenged territorial integrity of the parent states and thus do not imply 'creation' but disintegration. Terms such as warlord republic or rebel territory evoke more negative connotations and indicate illegitimacy and lack of order.[7] Similarly to widespread images of the entities such as 'black holes', which for long have been also prominent in academia, these notions reflect the violent formation of

4 According to Caspersen (2012, 11) entities constitute unrecognized states if they meet the following criteria: *De facto* independence, intention to further develop empirical statehood and expression of legitimacy by its authorities, pursued yet unachieved international recognition, and a minimum existence of two years. Kingston and Spears (2004) introduce the notion states-within-state. It differs from the above and similar definitions, however, in that the non-state entities do not necessarily have to pursue recognized sovereignty.

5 For a discussion of the term '*de facto* state', cf. Lynch 2004, 15pp; for a delimitation of the term 'unrecognized state', cf. Caspersen 2012, 8pp; on 'informal state', cf. Isachenko 2012, 19; for a legal perspective on the term '*de facto* regime', cf. Borgen 2007. Harvey (2010, 188pp) decidedly criticizes the notion '*de facto* state' for its politicized sub-text – a critique that basically extends to all concepts that include the term 'state'. According to him, it either rather reflects the secessionists' rhetorical ambitions than political reality or it readily assumes the objective of secession and external sovereignty, without that being necessarily the case. He therefore introduces the notion 'unrecognized entity' as a term with less political baggage.

6 Cf. Kolstø 2006, 723; for a definition of quasi-state, cf. Jackson 1990, 21; on para-states, cf. Klute and Trotha (2004, 110).

7 Both used by King 2007; cf. also Stanislawski 2008. For a general overview on terminology, cf. Steinsdorff and Fruhstorfer 2012, 118.

Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. In policy circles, too, the secessionist projects have been predominantly considered in terms of the potential of a re-escalation into large-scale war. Accordingly, policy-makers have treated the unrecognized entities as security risks for the South Caucasus but also with respect to stability of the wider region such as the European Union (cf. European Council 2003, 2008).

1.2 Unresolved conflict

As in the majority of secessions, the (*de facto*) ones of Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh have been violent. Open warfare in the early 1990s caused thousands of deaths, hundreds of thousands of people were and remain displaced; damage to livelihood opportunities was immense. The signing of ceasefires ended large-scale hostilities. Yet, while the mode of violent conflict changed, the conflicts have been persistent. In the case of the conflict on Nagorno-Karabakh, the post-ceasefire period is charaterized by static warfare at the heavily fortified *line of contact* that separates the conflict parties and more recently also at the state border between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Even though the name *line of contact* may indicate otherwise, contact between the populations has been basically reduced to zero. In the case of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, the ceasefire agreement entailed the deployment of a peacekeeping force and the establishment of a demilitarized zone. In particular until the *August War* of 2008, the *administrative boundary line* between Abkhazia and Georgia 'proper' was open for crossing. The development of fortifications with combat-ready armies facing each other as in the former case has thus been prevented. Instead, the conflict has been manifest in a highly volatile situation, particularly in the Abkhaz-claimed area adjacent to the *administrative boundary line*, which is home to the majority of Abkhazia's ethnic Georgian population. Despite a constant exchange of sniper-fire in the conflict on Nagorno-Karabakh, respectively a continuing precarious situation on the ground in the Georgian-Abkhazian case, prominent conflict databases that operate with quantitative definitions of violent conflict largely do not capture the South Caucasus conflicts in their post-ceasefire periods. According to their prime indicator, the number of battle-related deaths, the level of physical violence is too low to include them. For most of the post-ceasefire periods, indeed,

severe escalations or a renewed outbreak of open warfare has been avoided. One central assumption of this research, however, is that the exclusive emphasis placed on direct physical violence may only grasp one particular dimension of violent conflict. Especially for capturing prolonged conflicts, an understanding of violent conflict that rests solely on the number of battle-caused casualties is too narrow and therefore inadequate. Qualitative approaches to violent conflict, in contrast, also channel attention to mediate effects and a symbolic dimension of violence as well as to how violent conflict is embedded in local orders of knowledge. In line with such qualitative conceptualizations, this research approaches the violent conflicts on Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh through the prism of social condition (cf. also Lubkemann 2008; Richards 2005).

1.3 Research interest

Qualitative approaches to violent conflict distinguish themselves from quantitative ones through a more inclusive analytical lens. At the same time, they reflect a significant departure from previous assessments, prevalent in particular in political science and International Relations (IR), that (intra-state) violent conflict represents nothing but destruction. More recently, one strand of research has turned to considering the social condition of violent conflict as situated on one continuum with the social condition of peace. Instead of assuming breakdown, it is the social condition of violent conflict against which social processes unfold and social transformation takes place. While still under-developed, such a reorientation in the social sciences opened up avenues to explore those alternative social, economic, or political (non-state) orders that emerge in areas affected by violent conflict (cf. Duffield 1998). Despite a recent increase of such analyses, notably relations between violent (intra-state) conflict and political order have thus far received insufficient attention (cf. Kalyvas, Shapiro, and Masoud 2008). Widely accepted presuppositions that equate violent conflict with disorder have certainly constrained the exploration of alternative political orders. In addition, such investigations have been inhibited by the prevalent nexus in political science and IR that links political authority with the ideal-type of the modern Western (nation) state. This general trend is echoed by research on the South Caucasus *de facto*

states. Long neglected, these, too, have only in recent years been 'discovered' by social science scholars. Such a shift of attention has only selectively entailed a reflection on the implications of the ongoing violent conflicts for social processes within the entities, however, and the breakaway regions, too, have been predominantly approached with concepts that reflect liberal democracy and the Weberian bureaucratic ideal-type.

This research ties into the limited, albeit important theoretical discussion on (inter-)relations between (political) order and violent conflict and adds to the small but growing literature that engages with the South Caucasus unrecognized entities. The key interest is to explore the organization and (re-)production of political authority in conditions of violent conflict.[8] The *de facto* states Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh in their post-ceasefire periods constitute the empirical basis.

The disputed status of the entities and their emergence from secession provides the general background of such an investigation. Aspects of (incomeplete) institution-building and (flawed) democratization, which the literature on internal dynamics of the unrecognized states has particularly reflected upon, are accordingly touched upon as well. Yet, even though this research may deepen our knowledge of these and related issues, the combination of context-sensitive concepts to capture political authority with unorthodox approaches from the field of conflict research promoted here particularly aims at generating strongly empirically-grounded theoretical insight that adds to an emerging (political) sociology of violent conflict.

1.4 Composition

The book begins with a literature review (chapter 2) that presents both the state of theoretical reflection on (inter-)relations between political order and violent (intrastate) conflict as well as on the state of research on the

8 I use authority as the English equivalent to the German sociological notion of *Herrschaft* (accordingly: political authority as *politische Herrschaft*). 'Rule' and 'domination' are considered synonyms to authority and used interchangeably throughout the book (on the difficulty of translation, cf.Beetham 1991). The analytical concept of authority (as well as the related notion of legitimacy) may be applied to both state and non-state contexts and does not imply any judgment on the contested legal status of the here analyzed entities.

South Caucasus unrecognized entities. Reflecting upon achievements as well as shortcomings of these two fields, I formulate the central research question that aims at yielding added value on both an empirical and theoretical level. In the following chapter on the conflicts on Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh (chapter 3) I introduce the empirical cases. I trace the pre-histories of both secessionist entities and I outline the violent conflicts in their pre-and post-ceasefire periods. This descriptive introduction is complemented by a theoretical discussion where I contrast quantitative with qualitative perspectives on violent conflict. I argue that the latter offers a more comprehensive and also more suitable approach. While this chapter presents the conceptualization of violent conflict as social condition, which constitutes the overall angle of the research, chapter 4 develops a heuristic-conceptual framework to explore political authority and takes up the issue of implementation. Notably Bourdieu's notions of field of power and capital (resources) constitute the conceptual linchpins of the analysis. Following Bourdieu, I conceive of societies as being structured by the unequal distribution of different as well as differently valued resources and a corresponding division of actors into dominant and dominated. It is the field of power where dominant actors express their differently justified claims to rule and defend these against those of their competitors. Legal-rational bureaucracy, or here the *de facto pays légal*, may provide actors influential resources and effective strategies of self-justification. Yet, this is not necessarily and not exclusively the case. The Bourdieu-informed approach thus challenges taken-for-granted understandings of legal-rational rule, for here the '*(de facto)* state' may be one authority claim among several others. Such a flexible perspective, the attempt to spotlight the fields of power of Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, allows me to generate context-specific knowledge of political authority in the conflict-affected entities. I close the chapter by outlining the interpretive-qualitative perspective, introducing in particular the comparative interpretive case-study method and grounded theory applied in this research. Moreover, both for Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh I discuss the selection of each three crisis situations for in-depth investigation. The analysis of controversies in particular lends themselves to my research objective, since these are likely to bring power distributions to the surface.

In the empirical chapters (5 and 6) I present snapshots of the fields of power of Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Each chapter comprises an introduction to the case, an outline of the field of power based on the

analysis of each three episodes, and a discussion of changes to the fields of power over time. The empirical analysis reveals that both explored breakaways have engaged in state-building efforts. They have developed politico-administrative institutions separate from their 'metropolitan states' which have emulated the blueprint of the democratic, legal-rational state. Yet, in neither Abkhazia nor Nagorno-Karabakh impersonal, bureaucratic rule has conclusively taken root. While the *de facto* state structures have provided the struggle for political power within the contested regions with a particular framework and political leadership positions have been competed for, political power has not been administered by formal procedures and institutions only. Rather, alongside engaging the *de facto* state as a claim to (local) domination, actors in both entities have employed different forms of capital and a variety of self-justifications to secure political power. These alternatives have not always conformed to legal-rational rule and in particular the persistent violent conflicts have been important for actors' empowerment and disempowerment. 'Conflict-related' assets make up one of each four umbrella categories that classify effective resources and strategies in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. While on the level of individual assets differences between the cases exist, the established categories show considerable overlap: In the case of the latter, further categories are 'the *de facto* state structures and Soviet legacies', "external' support', as well as 'social relations and social networks'. In the former, the resources and strategies of dominant actors can be further linked to 'the *de facto* state structures and Soviet legacies', 'Abkhaz 'traditional' or informal institutions', and also "external' support'. A comparative and theoretical discussion of my findings (chapter 7) demonstrates that even though in the two cases the exertion and experience of physical violence has been contained and violent conflict has been differently manifest at the respective 'frontlines', the conflicts have influenced the distribution and valuation of resources as well as its justification in both entities. The Bourdieu-informed approach is thus not only fruitful for shedding light on the (*de facto*) *pays réel* but at the same time it lays bare the protractedness of the violent conflicts by revealing their entrenchment in the organization and (re-)production of political authority. Indeed, this entrenchment lets me suggest that violent conflict, at the least the conflict divide, is itself (discursively) reproduced. I conclude this book (chapter 8) with recapitulating and critically reviewing my findings. I indicate their transferability to other regions and beyond the particular phenomena of *de facto* states and

outline promising avenues for future research. Lastly, I summarize added value of my findings on both a theoretical and empirical level as well as possible benefit for policy-makers.

1.5 On terminology

The contested nature of Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh is not only reflected in the different notions used to address the entities. Terminology in general constitutes a lexical minefield. I wish to make clear from the outset that my choice of terminology is guided by pragmatic concerns only. It is informed by those approaches common in the respective scientific literature and the language used in reports by international NGOs working in and on the region. Explicitly my choice does not entail any claim on the legal status of Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh.

With respect to terminology three main points merit clarification: The use of geographical names, references to features of empirical statehood, and foreign language transliteration. First, place names in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh are highly disputed. Commonly, for each entity both Georgian and Abkhaz, respectively Azerbaijani and Armenian versions exist. While the former stress *de jure* control of the 'metropolitan states' over the regions, the latter reflect the claim of the unrecognized entities on these territories, which they (largely) control *de facto*. In the case of Abkhazia, Georgian and Abkhaz versions relate to districts and cities that for the most part have not changed from Soviet to post-Soviet times. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh the situation is more complicated. The Armenian capture of Azerbaijani territory, which during Soviet times lay outside the confines of the Autonomous Region of Nagorno-Karabakh as well as district reforms and renaming of places, respectively distinct transliteration of names implemented by both sides have rendered comparisons difficult (cf. Rowland 2004; Broers and Toal 2013).[9] Given that for Abkhazia Georgian and Abkhaz names refer to the same localities,

9 As noted by Saparov (2012, 283): "After the conflict of the 1990s both sides renamed the 'enemy' toponyms in the disputed area (…) and as a result it became almost impossible to understand the location of towns and villages. We now have four layers of place-names in the disputed territory: those of the Tsarist era were replaced by Soviet toponyms and two layers of post-conflict Armenian and Azerbaijani place-names."

I use both variants of geographical names for this case. This does not obstruct reading much as the Georgian version generally differs only in one additional letter. Accordingly, I write Sukhum/i for the 'capital' of Abkhazia or of the Gal/i region. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh correlations between Azerbaijani and Armenian versions are far more difficult to draw. Given this difficulty as well as my research focus on the *de facto* state I have adopted a more flexible handling. When first mentioned, I introduce the Azerbaijani names alongside the Armenian versions. Yet, I use Stepanakert when referring to the 'capital' of Nagorno-Karabakh, its name also during the Soviet period, instead of the Azerbaijani version Khankendi, which also was in use in the pre-Soviet period. I use both variants in Shusha/i, however, Nagorno-Karabakh's historical capital, which during the Soviet time was predominantly Azerbaijani populated. Lastly, I keep the Soviet era names when referring to the now Armenian controlled territories outside the former autonomous *oblast'*.

Geographical names are one issue. The other is how to refer to those instances of 'empirical statehood' that have developed in the entities. Some authors use inverted commas throughout their accounts ('president', 'parliament', 'presidential elections') to indicate that even though separate political institutions have been established and representatives elected, these are not recognized *de jure*. Others combine every such notion with the prefix '*de facto*' or 'unrecognized'. As these structures feature prominently in this research, I decided against a strict adherence to any of the variants to facilitate readability. This said, whenever reference is made to the entities, even if not made explicit, their unrecognized (Nagorno-Karabakh) or partly recognized (Abkhazia) status is being implied. To denote Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh as such, I primarily make use of the notions of *de facto*/unrecognized state/entity as well as secessionist entity, breakaways or contested territories to avoid repetition. I acknowledge the particular connotations of these notions yet think of these as rather appropriate to address Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh in the framework of this study. Again, such pragmatism shall not be confused with claims on legal status.

Lastly, pragmatism also guided my approach to transliteration. I employ the commonly used English variants when available: Thus, I speak of Nagorno-Karabakh instead of using the Russian-derived version Nagorny-

Karabakh.[10] While similarly I use Abkhazia to denote the *de facto* state, I use the transliterated version in 'Edinaya Abkhaziya', the proper Russian name of a local political party, instead of making use of the English translation ('United Abkhazia'). Indeed, in both cases with respect to political parties, movements, etc. commonly Russian and local, i.e. Abkhaz and Armenian, versions of their names exist. Except for when the latter variants are significantly more prevalent, I refer to them by their Russian (transliterated) or English (translated) names. In general, romanization of Russian words follows the BGN/PCGN system (United States Board on Geographic Names and Permanent Committee on Geographical Names for British Official Use).

10 The only exception I make is when using proper names that include alternative notions, such as in the *Democratic Party of Artsakh* where Artsakh is the Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh. For a discussion of the different names for Nagorno-Karabakh, cf. Broers and Toal 2013, 34.

2 Protracted conflict and political authority: state of research

Social science research on violent conflict and here notably on civil wars has been a prolific field of research. The debate on 'new wars' or the 'greed vs. grievance' controversy on root causes of violent conflict in particular sparked a plethora of literature.[1] While more recently dynamics within violent conflicts have also attracted attention, root causes have remained a preferred topic for investigation and have dominated the debate (cf. Veit, Barolsky, and Pillay 2011, 18; Taylor and Botea 2008, 32). Given this imbalance, i.e. a preoccupation with those dynamics that lead to the outbreak of violent conflict at the expense of engaging with dynamics in violent conflict, Cramer (2006, 21–2) suggests that "violence and war are more central principles for understanding institutions, politics and economic development than is typically acknowledged"– and accordingly more than has been explored. Indeed, notably in the fields of political science and International Relations surprisingly little research connects violent conflict with questions of (political) order; theorizing is still in its infancy or rather characterized by a certain lopsidedness with literature on so-called state failure dominating the field (cf. Kalyvas, Shapiro, and Masoud 2008).

2.1 Violent conflict and political order

For long, scholars in IR and political science have found it odd to combine the study of (intra-state) violent conflict with the study of order. Such a combination has been complicated by disciplinary compartmentalization.

1 On new wars, cf. Kaldor 1999; for a synopsis, cf. Mello 2010; on the 'greed vs. grievance'-debate, cf. Berdal and Malone 2000, and here in particular Collier; also Collier and Hoeffner 2001. For a recent synopsis of the debate, cf. Keen 2012.

Yet, it has also been linked to a prevalent view of (intra-state) violent conflict as being equivalent to chaos and thus as inevitably in opposition to order. When scholars have engaged with these issues, they thus have strongly focused on so-called failed or fragile states, the central characteristic of which has been the seeming presence of uncontrolled violence and lack of order. State failure, understood as a lack of a state's administrative capacity, was commonly considered "both a cause and a consequence of violence" (Brock et al. 2012, 47; cf. also Rotberg 2004).[2] The assessment of states as failed or fragile derived from assessing political order in areas outside the OECD-world against the Weberian legal-bureaucratic ideal-type: Scholars applied the ready-made template of the modern Western (nation) state for 'measuring' congruity or rather deviance.

Scholarly treatment of failed states has been propelled by a general tenor, not least perpetuated by representatives of Western governments, that these states constitute sources of instability with a potential for contagion. Questions of (intra-state) violent conflict and order have thus been approached from a problem-solving or containment-perspective: The disorder needed to be cured; the risk defused (cf. Bliesemann Guevara 2010, 114; Kraxberger 2007, 1055). To prevent a further spread of related security threats, international organizations and Western governments have engaged in external state-building initiatives, which have largely become synonymous with peace-building (cf. Hagmann and Höhne 2009, 46). Again, both the blueprint for such interventions and the envisaged outcome has been democratic, legal-bureaucratic statehood that echoes the Western ideal-type, considered part and parcel of a 'liberal peace'. Scholars accompanied these processes with the evaluation and the formulation of precepts for improvement.

The literature on external interventions is vast and usually when the term state-building is used, external intervention is meant (cf. Lambach and Debiel 2010).[3] In contrast, studies that assess contemporary (intra-state) violent conflicts as processes of state-formation *sui generis*, not entirely dissimilar from the bloody historical experience of the development of

2 Similar notions are failing or weak states. While I acknowledge the differences between the terms, for simplicity I use the term failed states as common denominator.

3 For an example of such a conflation, cf. Sutter and Raue 2009. For a critique, cf. Bliesemann Guevara 2010, who reminds us that not only Western countries or Western-dominated international institutions are engaged in state-building. For a literature review on peacebuilding, statebuilding, and governance, cf. Peace Research Institute Oslo 2011.

nation-states in Europe, are clearly inferior with respect to quantity (cf. Taylor and Botea 2008, 28).[4] Usually, such studies take recourse to Charles Tilly's (1982) famous dictum of 'war-making as state-making'. There has been controversial appraisal, however, whether Tilly's interpretation of European history can be fruitfully applied to account for developments in the contemporaneous, non-European world. In particular, a completely changed international environment and a much greater integration of states and non-state actors in global processes have been put forward as reasons against easy transferability (cf. Leander 2004; Schlichte 2003).

Despite research that favors a state-formation over a state-building perspective, the literature in political science and IR still mainly refers to violent conflicts as destructive phenomena, as equivalent to chaos and disorder. Scholars have sought to arrive at recommendations of how to 'fix' these failed states and how to suppress the 'reigning chaos' by external engineering or how to adjust external engineering for optimizing the outcomes. The dominance of such, to great extent normatively charged approaches to the study of violent conflict and (political) order seems to have three underlying causes: First, a Western-dominated scholarly and practitioners' community is only slowly coming around to conceding that Western-centric concepts might not hold for universal applicability (cf. Tickner 2003). Secondly, in particular in political science and International Relations, which conventionally have been pre-occupied with 'the state', scholars have only reluctantly turned to considering other forms of political authority as well, which are not entirely commensurate with Western ideal-types of legal-rational state-rule (cf. Hagmann and Höhne 2009, 45). And, as already argued, third, violent conflict has been viewed as the 'evil other', which by definition does not fit with order but disorder (cf. Imbusch and Bonacker 1999, 150pp; Mampilly 2011, 7).

While far from constituting the mainstream in political science and IR, some academics have recently been challenging these 'barriers' (cf. Bøås and Dunn 2007, 4). Thus, scholars have increasingly critically engaged with the literature on failed and fragile states and dismissed the approach for its "ethnocentric and hegemonic political agenda aimed at de-legitimizing states that fail to conform to the worldview of dominant states"(Newman

4 For the differentiation of state-building as an organized activity with a linear, projected trajectory and state-formation as uncontrolled and even contradictory historical development, cf. Bliesemann Guevara 2010.

2009b, 425).[5] Such and similar critique has triggered attempts to develop alternative approaches to explore political rule in the non-OECD world. The concept of 'hybrid political orders' (cf. Boege et al. 2009a, Boege et al. 2009b; Kraushaar and Lambach 2009) for example aims at capturing political orders that exist alongside and intermingled with those of the state, instead of assessing failed or fragile states as deviations of a Western-liberal ideal-type. Proponents of 'hybrid peace' or 'hybrid peace governance' take a similar perspective (cf. the respective special issue of *Global Governance*, 18/2012). While these approaches offer a welcome correction, they, too, have been criticized by peer-review for remaining schematic and thus for being of only limited use as analytical lenses that allow for portraying dynamics and complexity (cf. Trotha 2009). Such shortcomings might be linked to the continuous emphasis that these approaches put on external state-building. Often, they concentrate on 'hybrids' that evolve between 'local' political authority and externally-induced 'good governance', thereby paying insufficient attention to the various sources, manifestations, and actors involved in political authority in the regions under investigation. Even fewer scholars in political science and IR have turned more decidedly away from assessing 'what is lacking' in comparison to the ideal-type of the legal-rational state, to investigating 'what is there', thus exploring the "empirical emanations of statehood within and beyond the nation-state" (Hagmann and Höhne 2009, 53; cf. also Bakonyi and Bliesemann Guevara 2009).

Neither the debate of state failure with its remedy-approach, nor its critical counterpart necessarily engages with the issue of violent conflict. Given the above-cited linkage between state failure and lack of control of physical force, however, both fields are commonly closely connected. A critical discussion of the literature on failed or fragile states has thus been related to and cross-fertilized by a change of perspective on violent conflict. Instead of considering violent conflict as an extraordinary intrusion into the normalcy of peaceful (co-)existence, respective scholars have emphasized a continuum between war and peace. They have repudiated a strict opposition between peace, as ordered, productive, healthy on the one hand, and violent conflict, as disordered, destructive, diseased, on the other. Instead of highlighting differences and assuming breakdown of order with respect to the latter, these scholars have sensitized research(ers)

5 For a critical assessment, cf. also Ayers 2012; Hagmann and Höhne 2009; Schlichte 2005.

to look for similarities between the condition of peace and violent conflict (cf. Bakonyi and Bliesemann Guevara 2009; Duffield 1998; Jabri 1996; Lubkemann 2008; Richards 2005).[6]

Only such a rather fundamental change of approach, an "epistemological revolution" (Koloma Beck 2012, 16), has allowed scholars to fo-cus on the functional aspects of violent conflict, on its influence upon social processes and practices. Indeed, only this re-definition has attracted scholars to put those social, political, and economic orders in the center of interest that emerge in conditions of violent conflict; to analyze these not as deviations but as "alternative system[s] of profit and power" (Keen 1996, 14), and as "new and innovative ways of projecting political power" (Duffield 1998, 66). With respect to disseminating such a rather 'unorthodox' approach within political science and IR, research on war-economies has been particularly important (cf. for example Elwert 2003; Reno 1999; Rufin 1999). While acknowledging the insights of such research, Bakonyi and Stuvoy (2005, 363) also point out, however, that the preoccupation with economic issues has limited research into other aspects of these alternative (non-state) orders. Moreover, the prevalent concern with economic facets has promoted approaches that have rather narrowly assumed the instrumental rationality of actors and the generation of economic rents as their key driving force. This in turn consolidated a simplistic picture of these alternative orders and enforced their classification as purely criminal formations (cf. Mampilly 2011, 6).

Such shortcomings notwithstanding, of research on violent conflict and order in general as well as on alternative economic orders in particular, there have been important and intriguing investigations into the interdependencies of violent conflict and political authority that my research ties into and that have served as inspiration.[7] Thus, Gentschel and Schlichte (1997) point to transformations that societies affected by violent conflict undergo. They highlight that violent conflict may both 'push' and 'obstruct' careers; therefore it likely causes changes in the social structure. Depending on a boosted or a spoiled career, actors are likely to have vested interests in either prolonging or ending violent conflict. Schlichte (2004) later proposes to use Bourdieu's concepts of field and capital to

6 The issue of how to conceptualize and approach violent conflict is also picked up in chapter 3.

7 The studies referred to here are but a few examples. I discuss further work in the following chapters.

analyze these transformations by exploring the particular resources of war winners and war losers. Hensell and Gerdes (2012) take up this suggestion when they focus on how rebels convert or fail to convert into political elites in a post-war context. Among other theoretical input, they, too, draw on Bourdieu and the concept of capital. However, just as Schlichte's proposal for future research, Hensell and Gerdes, too, limit the analysis to three basic forms of capital, which, as I shall argue below, unnecessarily constricts the analysis. Also decidedly focusing on elites, Ismail (2008) likewise traces changes in the power elite through pre-war, war, and post-war reconstruction. He draws on another important elite theorist, namely C. Wright Mills whose work he adapts to render it viable for an African context. Ismail emphasizes the potential of violent conflict to bring about changes of the power elite of conflict-affected countries but likewise cautions against regarding it as a phenomenon that causes the breakdown of all existent structures. He (2008, 260) makes the important point that "it is imperative to consider, in reciprocal terms, how civil wars constitute a source of change, continuity and contradiction in relation to the power elite class". Raeymaekers, Menkhaus, and Vlassenroot (2008), too, distance themselves from a perspective of (intra-state) violent conflict as chaotic or anarchic and their edited issue explores how violent conflict may re-configure African socio-political realities. With their central focus on non-state governance they try to investigate manifestations of political authority without narrowing the analytical lens to features of legal-rational statehood.

While the overall research linking violent conflict to questions of political order is limited, these issues have come to play an increasingly important role in studies that focus on Israel and aspects of militarization (cf. Kimmerling 1993, 198). Rather opposite to the literature on failed states, research on Israel for long presupposed a Western liberal democracy that has functioned unaffected by persistent violent conflict. Thus, when scholars started to depart from such premises and engaged questions of militarism, the question of order nonetheless retained a prominent position. Scholars have focused more narrowly on civil-military relations and on militarized policy networks in the context of protracted conflict (cf. Barak and Sheffer 2006). Others have scrutinized the impact of persistent conflict on the Israeli social structure more generally. Ehrlich (1987) for example stresses that conflict cannot be reduced to the 'all out big war'. Interested in how violent conflict may re-configure societies, he traces its manifestations in Israeli society in seemingly 'routine' times, that is, those